

The House of Hohenzollern and The Hapsburg Monarchy

**By
GUSTAV POLLAK**

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and
The Hapsburg Monarchy

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The House of Hohenzollern

[From *The New York Nation*, March 22, 1917.]

IN all discussions of the fate of Germany in case of her ultimate defeat, the question of the attachment of the people to the Hohenzollern dynasty plays an important part. That Prussian loyalty will be equal to almost any test admits scarcely of doubt, but the question naturally suggests itself, Will other subjects of the Empire, notably South Germans, remain unshaken in their devotion to a dynasty that is responsible, as all Germans must eventually recognize, for the most disastrous war in history? It is difficult to make predictions at the present time, with the fortunes of war still trembling in the balance. One may safely say, however, that from the establishment of the present Empire to the outbreak of the war, every non-Prussian has been, first of all, a Saxon, Bavarian, Württemberger, etc., and only secondarily a German. We have on this point the highly instructive cor-

roboration of so excellent an authority as Prince Bismarck. He says, in the thirteenth chapter of his "Recollections":

Never, not even at Frankfort, did I doubt that the key to German politics was to be found in princes and dynasties, not in publicists, whether in parliament and the press or on the barricades. . . .

In order that German patriotism be active and effective, it needs dependence on a dynasty. Independent of dynasty, patriotism, as a practical matter, rarely reaches its full height. . . . It is as a Prussian, a Hanoverian, a Württemberger, a Bavarian, or Hessian, rather than as a German, that he is disposed to give unequivocal proof of patriotism. The German love of the Fatherland has need of a prince on whom it can concentrate its attachment. Suppose that all the German dynasties were suddenly deposed; there would then be no likelihood that the German national sentiment would suffice to hold all Germans together, from the point of view of international law, amid the friction of European politics, even in the form of federated Hanse towns and imperial rural communes ("Reichsdörfer"). The Germans would fall a prey to

nations more closely welded together if they once lost the tie which rests in the sense of the common importance of their princes.

Bismarck was never under any illusions as to the feeling of non-Prussian Germans towards the Hohenzollern dynasty. After the war of 1866 he labored hard to convince King William that it would be a serious mistake to punish Bavaria by forcing her to give up Anspach and Bayreuth to Prussia, just as it would be to compel Austria to give up part of her possessions. "I gauged," he wrote, "the proposed acquisitions from Austria and Bavaria by asking myself whether the inhabitants, in case of future war, would remain faithful to the King of Prussia after the withdrawal of the Prussian officials and troops and continue to accept commands from him; and I had not the impression that the population of these districts, which had become habituated to Bavarian and Austrian conditions, would be disposed to meet Hohenzollern predictions."

All this is well known. South-German dislike of Prussian ways is as old as the history of the Electors of Brandenburg and as recent as the present war, with its acknowledged friction between Prussian and non-Prussian commanders of the Central armies. The Hohenzollerns have ever ruled with a heavy hand, in peace as in war, and they do not go out of their way to enlist the sympathies of non-Prussians. Nor is it in politics and in warfare only that the antagonism between the Prussians and the people of other parts of Germany has found expression. German literature gives abundant proof that the Hohenzollern dynasty and the liberal sentiment of Germany have ever been far apart. None of the rulers of the house of Hohenzollern befriended German poets, with the single exception of the ill-starred Frederick III (while still Crown Prince), unless their verses glorified Prussian deeds. The greatest of Prussian rulers ignored contemptuously the greatest of German poets, and Lessing and Heine had as little cause to look kindly upon Berlin

as Goethe. Goethe visited the Prussian capital with Karl August of Weimar in May, 1778, and his impressions of Berlin life and of the surroundings of the King were far from favorable. "I have got quite close to old Fritz," he wrote, "having seen his gold, his silver, his statues, his apes, his parrots, and heard his own curs twaddle about the great man." The King and the poet had nothing in common. Frederick's judgment of Goethe's "Götz von Berlichingen" was as follows: "Voilà un Goetz de Berlichingen qui paraît sur la scène, imitation détestable de ces mauvaises pièces anglaises, et le parterre applaudit et demande avec enthousiasme la répétition de ces dégoûtantes platitudes." Frederick the Great cared only for French *savants*; he made one President of the Academy of Sciences, another Librarian. Goethe was not at all in sympathy with Frederick's plan of putting the federation of German sovereigns on a strong military basis. He feared not so much Prussia as the Prussian King, who had no consideration for small states like Saxe-Weimar.

In the summer of 1780 he spoke in the Aristophanic little play "Die Vögel," of "the Black Eagle with his ever-ready claws."

Under Frederick's successors the state of affairs in Prussia was even less to Goethe's liking. Frederick William II discouraged the development of science and free speech by every means in his power. Kant barely escaped being deprived of his professorship. The next King, Frederick William III, and his Queen, ostentatiously ignored Goethe on their visits to Weimar.

Schiller did not fare so ill in his relations with the Hohenzollerns, but he was not spared by the Berlin bureaucracy. In the last year of his life he wished for a wider sphere of activity than was afforded him in Weimar and Jena. He visited Berlin in May, 1804, and Queen Luise was seemingly anxious to have him settle there. On his return to Weimar he wrote to the royal Cabinet Counsellor Beyme that, while he found himself unable to leave Weimar permanently, he should be

willing, under certain conditions, to spend a few months every year in Berlin, but no answer to his letter was vouchsafed him.

Lessing had at various times gone to Berlin in the hope of finding there some suitable position. At one time, in 1765, he seemed to have some prospect of getting the royal librarianship. He was proposed to the King by one of his French favorites, Colonel Guichard, but Frederick, who had become prejudiced against Lessing through Voltaire's version of a previous quarrel between the two, refused to consider the suggestion. The position was offered to Winckelmann, but he declined it on account of the low salary, and Lessing's name was once more brought forward by Guichard. Frederick thereupon declared with vehemence that a Frenchman would get the place, and so a Frenchman did. Lessing felt the disappointment keenly. He wrote to his father later on: "I left Berlin after the only thing that I had so long hoped for and that had long been held out to me was denied me." It is safe to say, however,

that Frederick would never have found in Lessing a pliant employee, such as he liked to have near him. Lessing had previously, in 1764, declined the offer of a professorship of rhetoric in the University of Königsberg because of the condition that he was to deliver annually a eulogy of the King.

It is interesting to contrast with these experiences of Lessing in Prussia the attitude of the Austrian authorities towards contemporaneous men of letters. Lessing wrote to Nicolai: "Let some one dare to write in Berlin as freely as Sonnenfels is writing in Vienna." As early as 1711 Emperor Charles VI had made Leibnitz an Aulic Councillor and a baron of the Empire, and when the philosopher came to Vienna in 1713 and submitted to the Emperor a draft of the Peace of Utrecht, he received an annual pension of 2,000 florins, which Charles offered to double if Leibnitz agreed to settle in the Austrian capital.

The list of literary men who suffered from Prussian reactionism is a long one.

Börne, Herwegh, and Hoffmann von Fallersleben, among others, showed that there was mutual dislike, but no one embodied his hatred of Prussia in such flaming words as Heine; witness the preface to his "Französische Zustände." After speaking of Metternich's cynical but open defiance of liberalism and the mulish consistency of the Emperor Francis, he proceeded:

As regards Prussia we may speak in a different tone. Here at least we are not restrained by respect for the sacredness of the head of the German Empire. The learned minions on the banks of the Spree may dream of a great Emperor of the house of Borussia and proclaim Prussian hegemony, with all its glorious lordliness, but thus far the long fingers of the Hohenzollern have not yet succeeded in grasping the crown of Charlemagne and dumping it into the same bag with so many Polish and Saxon jewels. . . .

It is true that recently many friends of the Fatherland have desired the enlargement of Prussia and hoped to see in the kings the masters of a united Germany.

They have held out a bait to patriots and talked of Prussian liberalism, and the friends of liberty have begun to look confidently towards the Linden of Berlin, but as for me, I have never shared their confidence. On the contrary, I watched with anxiety the Prussian eagle, and while others spoke with so much warmth of how this bold eagle turned his eye toward the sun, I watched all the more carefully his claws. I did not trust this Prussian, this tall and canting white-gaitered hero, with his wide mouth and his rapacious stomach and his corporal's stick, which he first dipped in holy water before laying it on. I disliked this philosophic military despotism, its mixture of small beer, lies, and sand. Repulsive beyond expression was to me this Prussia, this stiff, hypocritical Prussia, this Tartuffe among the nations.

Heine allowed himself in his verse to go even further in denouncing Prussia and the house of Hohenzollern, but though as a poet and as a wit he abused his double license, he but over-emphasized the grievances of liberal Germany. There is perhaps in all literature no similar in-

stance of a dynasty incurring such fierce hatred on the part of one of the greatest writers of the nation.

Whatever concessions any ruler of the house of Hohenzollern, since the days of Frederick the Great, made to liberal ideas were wrung from him by bitter political necessity. The humiliating peace of Tilsit forced Frederick William III to adopt the reform plans of Stein and Hardenberg, but the stifling period of reaction that followed the War of Liberation, in the latter reign of the King and that of his successors, Frederick William IV and the Prince Regent (afterwards William I), was unrelieved, down to the Revolution of 1848, by any breath of freedom. Prussia was ready for Bismarck. From the outset there was no thought in his mind of making Prussia great in order to make her free. He sounded the keynote of his future policy in a speech in the Prussian Diet on December 3, 1850, when he said: "According to my conviction, Prussian honor does not consist in Prussia's play-

ing the Don Quixote all over Germany for the benefit of mortified parliamentary celebrities, who consider their local constitution in danger. I look for Prussian honor in Prussia's abstinence before all things from every shameful union with democracy." Bismarck's ideal was a great Prussia and only incidentally a great Germany; a liberal Prussia or a liberal Germany was never a part of his programme. In 1863, shortly after his accession to the Prussian Ministry of State, he wrote to Count von der Goltz, his successor as Ambassador to France: "The pursuit of the phantom of popularity in Germany, which we have been carrying on for the last forty years, has cost us our position in Germany and in Europe, and we shall not win it back by allowing ourselves to be carried away by the stream, persuaded that we are directing its course, but only by standing firmly upon our legs, and being first of all a Great Power and a German Federal State afterwards."

Bismarck remained true to his policy throughout his rule, yet when all its fruits had been garnered in, and he was surveying the past from his retreats at Friedrichsruh and Varzin, a gnawing doubt as to the permanency of the structure he had erected overcame him. "History shows," he wrote, "that in Germany it is the Prussian stock whose individual character is most strongly marked, and yet no one could decisively answer the question whether, supposing the Hohenzollern dynasty and all its rightful successors to have passed away, the political cohesion of Prussia would survive. Is it quite certain that the eastern and western divisions, that the Pomeranians and Hanoverians, the natives of Holstein and Silesia, of Aachen and Königsberg, would then continue as they now are, armed together in the indissoluble unity of the Prussian state?"

Many a German student of history who ponders at the present time the doubt as to the stability of the Hohenzollern dynasty expressed by Bismarck will recall the voice of a far-sighted German, the his-

torian Gervinus, who, when the unification of Germany was an accomplished fact, wrote an open letter to the Prussian King, "An das Preussische Königshaus" (published posthumously in 1872), in which he impressively argued that the annexation of German lands by Prussia after the war of 1866 had disgraced the house of Hohenzollern, and that it carried the seeds of future evil with it. All the glories of the war of 1870 did not blind Gervinus to the dangers threatening a Germany founded on militarism and not on justice and fair dealing. He foresaw with dread the creation of a military state such as the world had not seen even when Napoleon was at the height of his power. "We have," he wrote, "as regards power taken the place of France, but we shall draw upon ourselves all the hatred that France incurred." The following words have acquired an added impressiveness through the events of the past two years: "Is it not a fact that, at the time of the Luxemburg complications, when the secret treaties of alliance between Prussia

and the South German states were made public, the anger and suspicion of all Governments were aroused when it was shown that one day before the Peace of Prague a principal article of the Treaty had been violated? Can we ignore the fact that the new doctrine, 'Might before right,' surrounded as it is by all the halo of a brilliant statesmanship, has greatly undermined the hitherto prevailing principle of non-intervention among English statesmen of the old type?"

Developments within the German Empire since 1871 have justified the apprehensions of those who, like Gervinus, saw in the overshadowing importance of Prussia an ominous menace to the smaller German states. Their privileges as component parts of the German Empire have become a mere mockery under a Constitution which vests the Imperial succession in the house of Hohenzollern, with its hereditary right in the Presidency of the Federation, the casting vote of Prussia in case of a tie in the Federal Council, a permanent Prussian majority in the Reichstag,

and the prerogative of the King of Prussia as German Emperor in calling, adjourning, and proroguing the Reichstag. Parliamentary government in the real sense of the word has become impossible under a system which leaves the Imperial Ministers independent of the will of the Reichstag and relegates the Chancellors of the Empire to the position of mere tools of a Hohenzollern King. A further expansion of Prussia could only take place with a corresponding loss of prestige on the part of the smaller states. What, these states must have asked themselves more than once since the outbreak of the war, will be our gain if Prussian generalship triumphs? It is not too early to raise the question as to what will be their portion if Prussian supremacy ends in military disaster.

In any case, the day cannot be far distant when the intrinsic rights of Prussia to the part within the Empire she has arrogated to herself will be seriously questioned by descendants of those German stocks which contributed so largely to the

power of the old Germanic Empire during the thousand years of its existence. Franconians, Saxons, Luxemburgs, Hohenstaufen, as well as Hapsburgs, furnished the great rulers of the Holy Roman Empire long before a Hohenzollern was dreamed of as a possible Emperor. In these days of dynastic upheavals in other countries the experience of Germany as an hereditary monarchy within less than fifty years cannot be thrown into the scales as against the history of an elective Empire of a thousand years.

Prussia's supremacy as the German Kulturstaat *par excellence* has been too long assumed by militarists and Junkers, and too easily acquiesced in by the rest of Germany. Even in a purely military sense, Prussia, according to Bismarck himself, has long ceased to be as productive of great talents as was the case in the time of Frederick the Great. "Our most successful commanders," he wrote in his Memoirs, "Blücher, Gneisenau, Moltke, Goeben, were not Prussians originally, nor, in the civil administration, were Stein,

Hardenberg, Motz, and Grolman." The list of great Germans in other fields who were not Prussians by birth is endless. The names of Leibnitz, Liebig, Bopp, Grimm, Hegel, Gauss, Ehrenberg, Bach, Wagner, of Goethe, Schiller, Lessing, and many others of similar eminence, leap to the mind at once. And Dürer and Holbein, the South Germans, marked the climax of all German art long before the Mark Brandenburg had become the Kingdom of Prussia.

Bismarck's doctrines and Hohenzollern principles are now being tried in the furnace of a world war. Not all that can be said, and must justly be said, of Prussian leadership in the intellectual and material development of Germany can obscure the patent failure of the Hohenzollern dynasty. Prussian hegemony may have fed the German mind and body, but it has starved the German soul.

Bismarck's Neglected Policies

[From The New York *Evening Post*, April 14, 1917.]

SINCE the outbreak of the war the question has often been asked, What would Germany's policy in 1914 have been if Bismarck had been alive? Would there have been any war at all? In the first flush of victory the German people invoked the name of Bismarck as that of a patron saint blessing their arms and rejoicing in the fruits of his wisdom. Later on less was heard of Bismarck's share in preparing Germany for this war, and to-day his achievements are beginning to be viewed in a different light. History is not only being made but rewritten. Historiographers ask themselves. Can the fame of the man who brought about German unity after three successful wars survive unscathed the prodigiously unsuccessful one that was their result?

The thought of a powerful military attack on Germany often haunted Bismarck in his retirement. The forestalling of a coalition against Germany was to be the crowning work of his diplomacy. Any means to that end seemed proper to him. He brought about the Triple Alliance, not because he considered Austria-Hungary and Italy natural or particularly desirable allies of Germany, but because he felt that, with any two strong military countries backing Germany, she could withstand a possible coalition of any other two of the great Powers against her. Much as he had disliked and distrusted Austria all his life, he preferred her, on the whole, to Russia as an ally against France. But before definitely concluding the Triple Alliance, he carefully weighed in the balance all the possible combinations against Germany. Austria's help being assured, he felt reasonably safe against an attack by both France and Russia. "I should not consider," he reasoned, "a simultaneous attack by our two great neighbor Empires, even though Italy were not the third

in the alliance, as a matter of life and death," but the situation appeared to him much more serious if Italy were to threaten Austria's possessions on the Adriatic. "In that case," he wrote, "the struggle, the possibility of which I anticipate, would be unequal." And imagining France and Austria in a league with Russia, "no words," he said, "are needed to show how greatly aggravated would be the peril of Germany." In other words, he could conceive of an attack on Germany by three Powers as being literally a matter of life and death. And reasoning thus, he made sure, as he thought, of the friendship of both Austria and Italy.

Events have proved not so much Bismarck's wisdom as the folly of his successors. It would never have entered his mind to create a situation like that which confronts Germany to-day, with fourteen countries, including the United States, arrayed against her. He certainly did not foresee the possibility of Germany and Austria jointly declaring war on Russia and France and bringing England into

the conflict, while forcing Italy to break with her partners in the Triple Alliance. Bismarck presupposed that Germany and Austria would cultivate peace with Russia, and judged that their alliance "would not lack the support of England."

In concluding the alliance with Austria-Hungary, Bismarck was under no illusion as to the difficulties inherent in such a partnership. Official statements nowadays overflow with assurances of the most complete harmony between the two empires. Bismarck did not take such an idyllic view of an alliance promoted by him solely as the result of cold-blooded calculation.

In point of material force—he wrote in his *Memoirs*—I held a union with Russia to have the advantage. I had also been used to regard it as safer, because I placed more reliance on traditional dynastic friendship, on community of conservative monarchical instincts, on the absence of indigenous political divisions, than on the fits and starts of public opinion among the Hungarian, Slav, and Catholic population of the monarchy of the Hapsburgs.

Complete reliance could be placed upon the durability of neither union, whether one estimated the strength of the dynastic bond with Russia, or of the German sympathies of the Hungarian populace. If the balance of opinion in Hungary were always determined by sober political calculation, this brave and independent people, isolated in the broad ocean of Slav population, and comparatively insignificant in numbers, would remain constant to the conviction that its position can only be secured by the support of the German element in Austria and Germany. But the Kossuth episode, and the suppression in Hungary itself of the German elements that remained loyal to the Empire, and other symptoms showed that among Hungarian hussars and lawyers self-confidence is apt in critical moments to get the better of political calculation and self-control. Even in quiet times many a Magyar will get the gypsies to play to him the song "Der Deutsche ist ein Hundsfott" ("The German is a blackguard").

Germany, as Bismarck was well aware, was not loved either in Russia or in Austria-Hungary. "Could anti-German rancor," he asked, "acquire in Russia a

keener edge than it has among the Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia, the Slovenes of the provinces comprised within the earlier German Confederation, and the Poles in Galicia?" Nor did Bismarck consider the stability of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy as assured beyond doubt. "The factors which must be taken into account," he wrote, "are as manifold as is the mixture of her populations, and to their corrosive and occasionally disruptive force must be added the incalculable influence that the religious element may from time to time, as the power of Rome wakes or wanes, exert upon the directing personalities." He foresaw that not only Pan-Slavism and the Bulgarian, Bosnian, Serbian, Rumanian, the Czech, and the Polish questions, but also the Italian question in the Trentino, in Trieste, and on the Dalmatian coast, might become dangerous not merely as affecting Austria, but as precipitating a European crisis. What has been so often asserted and as often officially denied, as to the friction between the German-Austrians and the Czech soldiery,

is clearly foretold in Bismarck's statement: "In Bohemia the antagonism between Germans and Czechs has in some places penetrated so deeply into the army that the officers of the two nationalities in certain regiments hold aloof from one another, even to the degree that they will not meet at mess."

Bismarck did not shrink from war if it suited his purpose of aggrandizing Germany and, above all, Prussia, but he never sought war needlessly. "During the time that I was in office," he wrote, "I advised three wars, the Danish, the Bohemian, and the French; but every time I first made clear to myself whether the war, if successful, would bring a prize worth the sacrifices which every war requires, and which are now so much greater than in the last century." He considered Germany as perhaps the single great Power in Europe which had nothing to gain by provoking war. "We ought to do all we can," he said, "to counteract the ill-feeling which has been called out through our

growth to the position of a really great Power, by honorable and peaceful use of our influence, and by convincing the world that a German hegemony in Europe is more useful and less partisan and also less harmful to the freedom of others than that of France, Russia, or England." He stated emphatically that Germany required no increase of contiguous territory, and that her only object should be to convince other nations of her peaceful intentions. "I have followed my own prescription," he remarked, "not without some personal reluctance, in my course towards Spain in the question of the Caroline Islands and towards the United States in that of Samoa."

How was it possible, it will be asked, that German statesmen of to-day, knowing all about Bismarck's misgivings as to the sincerity of the friendship between Austria and Germany, and about his dread of embroiling the two countries in a useless war against France and Russia, could enter so light-heartedly upon their stupendous venture? The answer is to

be sought not only in their natural ignorance of their own limitations, but in the example of unscrupulous selfishness and, if need be, cynical brutality set them by their great protagonist during the entire course of his career. Lacking his intellectual force and his unrivalled resourcefulness, they thought themselves safe in adopting his tactics and improving upon them. Was it not Bismarck's principle that all contracts between great states cease to be unconditionally binding as soon as they are tested by the struggle for existence, and that no great nation will ever be induced to sacrifice itself on the altar of fidelity to contract? Starting with this premise, what could be more logical than the invasion of Belgium, with all that followed?

Bismarck had no diplomatic scruples of any kind, but he knew how to guard his diplomatic secrets. His occasional sincerity in disclosing the past was his best asset in making future deceit possible. It is quite clear that he never foresaw the possibility of a war between the United States

and Germany, but had he foreseen it he never would have resorted to such devices as were employed by his successors, the agile Bülow and the ponderous Bethmann-Hollweg. Bülow was puerile enough to imagine that a Deutsch-Amerikanischer Nationalbund would forever solidify the sentiment of German-Americans against their adopted country, and Bethmann-Hollweg allowed the ingenious Zimmermann to concoct his little Mexican-Japanese scheme. Not such, with all its tergiversations, was Bismarck's foreign policy. Woe to the German people that they have chosen to disregard its strength and to cling to its weakness!

The Vision of a Central Europe

[From The New York *Nation*, December 14, 1916.]

FEW polemical books written during the present war have called for serious criticism. When passion shrieks, reason can only be silent. Friedrich Naumann's "Mitteleuropa" (*Central Europe*. Translated by Christabel M. Meredith, London: P. S. King & Son), however, stands in some respects in a class by itself. A fervent economic plea for Germany's future expansion, it is but indirectly concerned with the present clash of arms and ignores international hatreds. The book, which has had an extraordinary vogue throughout Germany and Austria-Hungary, is now obtainable in an English translation (faithful, though by no means flawless) to which Prof. W. J. Ashley has written an introduction. He speaks of it as "far and away the most important book that has appeared in Germany since the

world-conflict began.” Such a success challenges thought, even aside from the intrinsic merits of the work. It will therefore not be superfluous to examine in detail the arguments that have made so powerful an appeal to German and Austro-Hungarian readers.

Herr Naumann is a member of the Reichstag and author of a number of books. His career shows strange mutations of principle—religious, political, and economic. Originally a Lutheran pastor and Socialistic evangelist, he abandoned the pulpit for journalism and politics. He founded *Die Hilfe*, and through this journal and his book on “Demokratie und Kaisertum” attempted to reconcile the tenets of Social-Democracy with the prevailing furore for naval and colonial expansion. The National-Socialist party being unable to obtain representation in the Reichstag, Herr Naumann allied himself with the *Volkspartei*, which derived its strength mainly from the middle-class radicals of southern Germany. As an ardent free-trader and advocate of certain

definite legislative measures, he succeeded in gaining a seat in the Reichstag, where he attempted to fuse several minor radical groups into a wing of the Liberal party. In a book written at that time, his "Neu-deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik," he predicted the political and social regeneration of Germany through unrestricted intercourse with other countries. Such was Herr Naumann's past political philosophy; what is his present creed?

Briefly speaking, Naumann advocates, one may say he foretells, as in a prophetic vision, a combination—it is nowhere directly called an alliance—between the German Empire and the Hapsburg Monarchy, offensive and defensive, economic and military, into which as many neutral states as possible may and should, as a matter of self-interest, eventually enter. The adhesion of Turkey and the Balkan states is taken for granted. The advantages of such a superstate to the neutral countries which are to join their maritime front to the territory of the Central Powers, specifically to Holland, Greece, Rumania,

and the Scandinavian countries, are but vaguely alluded to—for prudential reasons dictated by the war. The main purpose of the formation of this “Central Europe” is, as frankly admitted by the author, the greater good of the two principal countries, Germany and Austria-Hungary. Without committing himself to any definite plan for the organization of this vast state, Herr Naumann tentatively puts forth a programme which he says statesmen of the future may modify at their pleasure. This includes common recruiting laws, mutual military inspection, a joint committee for foreign affairs, joint boards for the control of railways and of river navigation, common coins and measures, common banking and commercial laws, common military expenditures, mutual liability for national debts, equality of customs tariffs, joint collection of customs, equal laws for the protection of labor, equal laws of association and trust laws, etc. There may or may not be eventually free trade between Germany and the group of states that are to join her, but

the bond of cohesion between them will primarily be a political one. Economic considerations will adjust themselves to their common political interests.

In the programme thus outlined the need of permanent preparedness for war is repeatedly emphasized. Hence regulation of the storage of grain becomes a matter of paramount importance. This and similar measures Herr Naumann would entrust to several commissions, which he proposes to locate as follows: Budapest is to be the grain centre, Prague the centre for all treaty matters, Hamburg the centre of the maritime trade, Berlin the exchange centre, and Vienna the legal centre. But it is only after peace has been declared that it will be possible to formulate a definite programme, and the gist of such a programme can, in Herr Naumann's opinion, be summed up in two words: "better organization." It was Prussian organization that paved the way for the successes of this war, and if, says he, the opponents of Germany like to label the intrinsic connection between the works of peace and

those of war as "German militarism," they are welcome to it. The wholesome effect of Prussian military discipline pervades, in his view, the whole of Germany from top to bottom.

Enthusiastic to the point of rhapsody as Herr Naumann is over his project, he does not wholly ignore the difficulties of its execution. He realizes that the Government of Austria-Hungary may have to be argued and cajoled into a partnership in which that country is bound to be the weaker member. Germany will have to make it clear that there is no thought of interfering with the internal affairs of the Hapsburg Monarchy, and that the delicate questions of race and language which have so long agitated that country would be let alone by the Germany of Central Europe.

What is to be the geographical extent of this powerful congeries of states? It is Herr Naumann's ambition to see Central Europe comprise about 5,000,000 square miles, that is to say, one-tenth of the inhabited surface of the globe. He

arrives at his estimate by a series of daring steps. Starting with the 450,000 square miles of Germany and Austria-Hungary, he adds, first, the 900,000 square miles of "a number of neighboring European states," and then "claims" all of European and Asiatic Turkey, thereby swelling the figures to 2,500,000 square miles. Add the colonies of the German Empire and you have 4,000,000 square miles, and "if we venture to count in the overseas possessions of neighboring states which have not yet joined us, we may arrive at approximately 5,000,000 square miles"—a figure which he admits is "somewhat arbitrary." The population of this Central Europe, beginning with the 116,000,000 inhabitants of the German Empire and Austria-Hungary, will, in the manner described, mount up to about 200,000,000, or, roughly, one-eighth of the population of the globe.

Fantastic as this programme seems to be, it is undeniable that Herr Naumann's teachings are spreading, and will have to be reckoned with in the future.

Already Austrian and German trade unions have given their adhesion to the plan, and even councils of German and Austrian Socialists have approved of it. So conservative a German economist as Professor von Schmoller is arguing that the present time urgently calls for close tariff arrangements with Austria-Hungary, and that "the leading men of nearly all classes and parties are gradually meeting under this flag." Naumann himself foresees certain objections within Germany itself. He fears that his scheme will be viewed with suspicion by Prussian nobles, the conservative, powerful, and domineering (*herrschaftsstarke*) Old Prussian, as well as the "Liberal capitalist," who, though for opposite reasons, equally distrusts Austria-Hungary. To these two types must be added the "Greater-Germans," whose ideal is a purely Germanic state, and who are already groaning under the burden of the Poles, Danes, and French Alsatians of the Empire.

Herr Naumann, furthermore, realizes that the Magyars are not in love with the

Germans, but he relies on their keen desire to retain their supremacy over the Slavs, and reasons that they will grasp at anything Germany may offer them to attain their ends. From a purely economic point of view, Austria-Hungary and the other members of the Central European combination are to be won over by a system of mutual tariff preferences which shall protect the industrially weaker countries.

Herr Naumann, it must be admitted, presents his case with considerable skill. He writes picturesquely and, in the main, clearly and forcibly. His occasional sentimental outbursts, and the studied vagueness to which German writers are so prone, but enhance the interest of the book in German eyes. He is careful not to burden his readers needlessly with statistics. These and certain dry historical facts are relegated to a separate chapter at the conclusion of the book.

While Naumann's thesis is apparently a simple one, he finds it necessary to bolster it up with assertions and prophecies of various kinds. We meet at the outset with

the statement that there is no room, at the present time, for France in the new Central Europe. Having chosen to ally herself with England, she will, unfortunately for her, "in the near future become a greater and better Portugal." Yet even for her Herr Naumann would leave a door open, perhaps only in a distant future, for, like so many Germans, he professes to harbor no ill-feelings towards France. Italy, too, he does not consider, for all time to come, necessarily ineligible to partnership in Central Europe, though he cautiously adds, "the armies on the Isonzo have the first word." Germany's present ally, Turkey, being "antiquated" and separated from Central Europe, both geographically and nationally, is not hailed with delight as a future partner. But Central Europe will eventually determine the conditions of its own existence. Though Herr Naumann carefully refrains throughout his book from speaking harshly of any of the belligerent nations, there is an unmistakable Bismarckian flavor in some of his arguments.

All participants in the Great War must feel that neither now nor in the future can small or even moderate-sized countries have any voice in world politics. "Our conceptions of size have entirely changed, only very large states can assert their individuality, all the little ones live by profiting from the quarrels of the great, and must first ask their permission if they would make an unusual move." The world thinks, as Cecil Rhodes says, "in continents." A generation, Herr Naumann surmises, will be required for the task of establishing Central Europe, even if peace, declared on the basis of victory of the German-Austrian arms, seals the permanent solidarity of the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns. A shade of doubt as to this solidarity—hardly as to the victory itself—enters even Herr Naumann's mind. "The question will arise: Are the Ambassadors from Berlin, Vienna, and Budapest going to leave the hall of the National Peace Congress as open and honest friends or as secret opponents?" If peace is only to pave the way for future misunderstand-

ings, Europe will face another Vienna Congress of 1815. "In that case, for what shall we have sacrificed our sons and the mutilated Hungarians their limbs?" A perplexing question, indeed! As dangerous as the admission that after the conclusion of peace "we all shall be more careful than hitherto to suppress frivolous pretexts for war and to strive for a mutual understanding between nations."

For Herr Naumann, as for every German and Austro-Hungarian, the war began "purely as a defensive one," though in the same breath he tells us that "in the German Empire two ideas had always been present in the minds of the people and the Government: that sooner or later a break with the Czar was bound to come, and that some time there would have to be a fight with England for the control of the seas. The only unexpected thing was that all came together with a rush—the war in France, the war in the East, and the naval war."

Leaving aside Herr Naumann's speculations as to the origin of the war, it is worth

while to raise some doubts as to the feasibility of his plans after its conclusion. Economic considerations are certainly powerful factors in the development of modern nations, but all statesmen must reckon with the facts of human nature. Nations and races will go on with their in-born or cultivated likes and dislikes after the war as before. It becomes necessary to remind those who so glibly assume Austria-Hungary willingness to listen to Germany's siren voice after the war that the mutual jealousies of Austria and Prussia are of very long standing, and have not been wholly interrupted by the present war. It was Frederick II who inaugurated the systematic policy of weakening Austria in order to strengthen Prussia. Conversely, Joseph II sought to recover Austria's prestige by isolating Prussia and regaining new territory, whether in the East or in the West. Thenceforth there was mutual distrust between the two countries, though Joseph II, immediately after Frederick's death, thought for a moment of burying old animosities and founding

an Austro-Prussian alliance which would guarantee the peace of Europe. Prussia, however, soon emphasized her antagonism to Austria by her machinations within the German Empire, at Mainz and Worms, while Joseph II turned to Russia as the natural friend of Austria. Under Metternich's régime the mutual jealousies were accentuated. He rejected contemptuously Stein's plan of dividing the overlordship of Austria and Prussia in Germany along the lines of the Main. Metternich was shortsighted enough to think, even after the disappearance of the Holy Roman Empire, that Austria might guide the destinies of both Germany and Italy, and he called the Congress of Vienna together with this end in view. Prussia never ceased to watch her opportunities, and knew how to bide her time.

Bismarck, who is generally credited with the authorship of the plan for a Central Europe, tells us in his "Gedanken und Erinnerungen" that he never thought, in the days of the German Bund, while advocating the union of all Germany on a

dualistic basis, of anything but Prussian hegemony. He frankly told Count Károlyi, the Austrian Ambassador, in 1862: "Our relations must either improve or grow worse. You will learn to deal with us (Prussia) as a European Power." Throughout his career Bismarck never lost his contempt for Austria, though after the war of 1866, foreseeing the Franco-German War of 1870, he shrewdly insisted on treating Austria leniently in order to secure at least her passive attitude towards Germany later on. Austrians still remember Silesia and Sadowa, and they have not grown fonder of Prussia during the present war. Both Austrians and Hungarians complain, as Herr Naumann admits, of the German, and especially the Prussian, want of consideration, of their overbearing manners, etc. "Modern Germans," he says, "are almost everywhere bad Germanizers." "Why is it," he naïvely asks, "that we Germans of the Empire are during this war so little liked by the rest of the world?"

The question which he leaves unanswered was discussed at some length dur-

ing the Franco-Prussian War in an editorial article in the *Nation* (Oct. 20, 1870: "Popular Notions of Prussia.") at a time when the *Nation*, like the rest of the most thoughtful organs of public opinion throughout the United States, was strongly on the side of Germany. Its remarks are pertinent at the present time:

As to Prussia's habitual want of popularity, it is one of the most curious phenomena in modern history. Prussia has invariably been disliked, not only by her enemies, but by her very friends and allies. The Poles, of course, hate her (and who would blame them for that?), but even the Russians dislike her, notwithstanding the intimacy and relationship of the two sovereigns. So do the Austrians, so did the Bavarians and Württembergers, the Dutch and the Danes, the English and the Italians, and their dislike seems to have nothing to do with political jealousies or grievances. Nor do the French form an exception to the rule, although it is but fair to say that before the war at least there was nothing personal even in their *chauvinism*. There must, of course, be some real and tangible reason for all this. It is natural enough that, when once a

prejudice exists against a country, the stranger who visits or traverses it can rarely be in a proper condition of mind for steering clear of difficulties and scrapes, and these difficulties will enhance rather than correct his prejudices. But we can hardly call prejudice a natural aversion to what must appear forbidding and ungenial to everybody not rendered callous by life-long habit. The bureaucratic hardness of Prussian officials, and the rigid compulsory method with which Prussia enforces the acceptance of her gifts and her protection, as well as of her burdens, are certainly not calculated to beget good will, and we can hardly wonder if Prussia enjoys the strange distinction of being disliked by a good many of her own people, who would willingly allow themselves to be educated, vaccinated, taxed, and drilled, but who either object to the official *modus operandi* or are anxious to sell their obedience for a fair measure of constitutional rights.

Herr Naumann quotes the experience of the North-German Confederation, before 1870, in its dealings with South Germany, as an example of how easy it was to overcome the scruples of Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, etc., concerning a

closer union with Prussia; but he has to admit that they had maintained before the Franco-German War an attitude of distrust towards Prussia which even now has not wholly disappeared. "The Berliner was in their eyes long an alien, and is so in part even to-day." If Germany is defeated, Prussia will be less an object of veneration in South German eyes than ever before; but even if she is victorious, will the feeling between South Germans and Prussians be all that may be desired? Will there be unmixed mutual respect and due appreciation of what each has accomplished to bring about victory? Prussia's preponderance in Central Europe will be far greater than her present dominance in Germany. What will Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden have gained to compensate them for sinking into positions of relatively greater inferiority than they had been chafing under before the war? Herr Naumann sees only a benign thought in the "controlling concept (Oberbegriff) of a Central Europe dominating over Germans, French, Danes, and Poles in the

German Empire, over the Magyars, Germans, Rumans, Slovaks, Croats, and Serbs in Hungary, over Germans, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles and Southern Slavs in Austria." All these will "of their own accord (von selbst)" speak German—as though Naumann had never heard of bloody riots in Bohemia over the question of using the dual languages in schools, in law courts, etc., and as though Prussia had not, according to Prince Bülow, failed utterly in her attempts to impose the German language with an iron hand on the recalcitrant school children of Posen. Nothing, however, appears difficult to the sentimentalist in politics. In Herr Naumann's eyes it is the easiest thing in the world for Vienna and Berlin to supplement each other, with great advantage to both. "We," he says, addressing himself to Austrians, "have more horsepower, and you more music. We think more in terms of quantity, the best of you rather in terms of quality. If we can fuse our respective abilities, then and for the first time what is harsh in modern German civilization will

acquire through your assistance the touch of charm which will make it tolerable to the outside world." How simple a process this fusion ("zusammengiessen") appears to be in the delightful vagueness of Herr Naumann's pages!

And even if Austrians and Germans allow themselves to be carried away by such glittering phrases, the sober-minded Hungarians may in due time be trusted to look at the situation after the war with a keen eye to their own interests. The Magyars have never fully relished the union with Austria, and, no matter what their present attitude may be, they will never allow the Dual Monarchy to enter into any scheme that may threaten to interfere with their future freedom of action. Herr Naumann assumes that under German influence the plains of Hungary will become much more productive. They may, indeed, but how will that influence be exerted without wounding the susceptibilities of the proud Magyars? Already we hear of fierce protests in the Hungarian Diet against the in-

solent interference of German purchasers of Hungarian farms. Will the Hungarian peasantry be less resentful after the war? Count Széchenyi, "the greatest Magyar," as he is sometimes called by his countrymen, said in the Diet of 1843: "How does a nation come to possess the force and virtue necessary for its political action? If the majority of the individuals composing it are to fulfil humanely and honorably their appointed task, they must acquire, above all, the art of pleasing, the faculty of attracting and absorbing the neighboring elements. Is it likely that a people will possess this faculty who will not respect in others that which it insists on having respected in itself? It is a great art to know how to win men's hearts." Unless the Prussians of Central Europe shall draw the Magyars to their hearts more easily than they have drawn to themselves their South-German brothers, the future of Central Europe must remain dubious.

A mere hint at the numberless problems which would confront the Slavs of Hun-

gary and Cisleithania under the scheme of a Central Europe must suffice. A strengthening of German influence, in whatever shape, and however disguised, must inevitably entail a weakening of Slavic power, and such a scheme will therefore arouse suspicion and resentment among the Slavs within Central Europe. The mutual relations of other nationalities that will be asked to join Germany, Herr Naumann conveniently ignores. Rumania, for instance, may or may not disappear from the map of Europe as a consequence of the war; in either case, will the Rumans of Hungary be better satisfied to remain under Magyar rule, with German overlordship, than they have been hitherto? Will the Magyars themselves be more kindly disposed towards them? Will the Ruthenes of Galicia dislike the Poles less, and love the Teutons more, in a new superstate? But everything seems to fit into Herr Naumann's scheme. Yet, though Bulgarians and Serbs may be only Slavs to him, and therefore destined to be thrown into a common melting-pot, their

national characteristics and differences will outlast the war. The Bulgarians are a practical and energetic people, not given to boasting of their ancestry, like the Serbs. They may, or may not, have made a mistake in casting in their lot with the Teutons, but their future still lies largely in their own hands. They may desert Germany, as they have deserted Russia. What will be the feeling of the Serbs of Hungary towards Germany? Each Balkan race will survive the war at least to the extent of being able to plague its neighbors. And who can foretell whither, in the readjustment of Europe after the peace, the force of a former Pan-Slavism will tend? Will Poles, Serbs, and Bulgars fraternize under the common ægis of a Central Europe? A stroke of the pen has resuscitated the ancient Kingdom of Poland—with the status of Galicia and Posen still undefined—but the fortunes of war may wipe it off the scrap of paper on which the two Emperors signed their edict.

So far the war has settled nothing, though what the rule of blood and iron can accomplish, Germany under Prussian rule has accomplished. Prussian generals have won new glory for Prussian military efficiency. But in proportion as they have succeeded, they have sown the seeds of envy and dislike in the rest of Germany and in Austria-Hungary. Political prognostications of writers and statesmen and even Imperial rescripts have turned out poor prophecies before this. Naumann sees in the Germany of to-day a "half-finished product," but Central Europe is to develop somehow the fairest flower of modern civilization—"a type of man intermediate between Frenchmen, Italians, Turks, Russians, Scandinavians, and Englishmen"—and all this is to "grow around Teutonism." Such is the fabric of his dream.

At bottom, stripped of all its fine phrases, Herr Naumann's gospel of the great transformation is the old familiar one of coercion—friendly coercion, by open flattery and half-veiled insinuation, but still

coercion. He admits that for Austria-Hungary to enter the Central European combination will involve "a certain sacrifice—not to be regarded lightly—of economic independence and of her rights as a free state" (her "staatsrechtliche Ungebundenheit"), but, he finally says in cold blood, "the transaction is necessary, according to all teaching of history, to the further continuance of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy."

And the continuance of the Hapsburg Monarchy is in doubt because in the chain of his reasoning the continuance of wars is impliedly assumed as axiomatic. Free as he is from the chauvinism of a Bernhardi or a Reventlow, there is no proof, in his plea for a Central Europe, that he believes in the march of political progress, in the humanizing and liberalizing influences that are already at work in other countries to make further wars impossible, or at least more difficult than hitherto. He no more reads the thought of the best elements of Germany than he understands the inmost feelings of Austria-Hungary—not

to speak of England, France, and America. But though the mind of Prussia may remain unchanged after the war, must we assume that the soul of German-Austrians, Magyars, and Slavs is bound to undergo a complete transformation?

Austria's Opportunity

[From The New York *Evening Post*, March 31, 1917.]

NEVER before in the troubled history of the Monarchy have the perplexities of the Hapsburg rulers been so great as now. Internally and externally, Austria-Hungary is beset by apparently insoluble problems. In all parts of the Empire there is distress, dissatisfaction, divided council. To cap the climax, the question of a break with the United States now looms up portentously. In Cisleithania the subject is being approached with the caution imposed by the censor; in Hungary, however, there is greater freedom of speech. Magyar papers have repeatedly pointed out the folly of antagonizing a country which plays so large a part in Hungary's economic life. In thousands of Hungarian homes the only means of sustenance comes from the United States. It is safe to say that more than fifty million dollars is sent annually by Austro-Hungarian subjects and naturalized

Americans of Austro-Hungarian birth to relatives in the Empire, twenty-five millions alone coming from Slovak miners in Pennsylvania and elsewhere. How can Austria under present conditions face the cessation of such a revenue? And this question opens up the larger one of the origin and the issue of the war.

More and more frequently, in Austria as in Hungary, people are asking, what have we to gain by continuing the war? The promises held out by the Hohenzollern to the Hapsburg before the fatal ultimatum to Servia, have long since lost their potency. The new Emperor and his advisers are disillusioned, the people weary and half-starved. The political outlook in all the Austrian crown lands, with the possible exception of Galicia, is dreary in the extreme. Every semblance of constitutional government has disappeared in the Austrian half of the Empire. The Vienna Reichsrat has not been convoked in three years. The Czechs, whom the Emperor had hoped to conciliate by the appointment of Count

Clam-Martinitz as Austrian Premier, branded the Minister as a renegade; in Hungary the opposition to the pro-German policy of Tisza is becoming more and more pronounced. The Hungarian Premier is held responsible, jointly with the German Chancellor, for the disastrous failure of the German peace proposal. Count AndrÁssy, the leader of the Constitutionalists; Counts Apponyi and Károlyi, the leaders of the two Independence parties; ex-Premier, Dr. Alexander Wekerle, and other influential men—some in the ranks of the Democratic party—are undermining the position of the formerly all-powerful Tisza, and with his fall Hohenzollern influence in the councils of the Hapsburg monarchy will have received a deadly blow.

Throughout the war Germany's efforts to Teutonize Hungary have been keenly resented by the proud Magyars. In the Diet the insolence of German purchasers of Hungarian estates has provoked bitter discussion and the propagandist visits of two leading German politicians, Herr

Bassermann and Count Westarp, to the Hungarian capital, have been sarcastically commented upon by the Budapest press. Thus the *Népszava* said: "German Kultur is sufficiently well represented in Hungary to make it unnecessary to found any fresh associations for its dissemination." Conversely, German newspapers have complained of the intolerant attitude of the Hungarians. The Munich *Neueste Nachrichten* deplores the inability of the Magyars to appreciate the purely cultural efforts of Germany, and revives the old charge of Magyar oppression of other nationalities.

The fact is, the Hungarians are, as they have always been, an intensely practical people, and they will not compromise their future for the sake of pleasing either Hohenzollern or Hapsburg. The bait of becoming the guardians of the grain emporium in the post-bellum Central Europe has been spurned by clear-sighted Magyar statesmen, and though Hungary has gone far enough in following German

leadership, there are indications that she will not go the full length of Hohenzollern desires.

Least of all will the Germans of Cisleithania be entrapped into approval of the last mad scheme of Hohenzollern statesmanship—open defiance of the United States. During the fifty years that have elapsed since the Compromise with Hungary the balance of power within Cisleithania has inclined, now to the German elements—liberal or conservative—now to the Czechs or Poles; but through it all Vienna has remained the centre of the Empire. German-Austria still rules the rulers, if not the Monarchy. The new Emperor reflects, like Francis Joseph, the feeling of Vienna, and this is, and ever has been, antagonistic to Berlin. Vienna, even before the war, retained much of its old dislike of Prussian ways, and Berlin reciprocated this feeling. What an acute student of Kulturgeschichte, Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl, wrote half a century ago concerning the relations of Vienna and Berlin is still largely true:

“As regards mutual depreciation and lack of understanding, North and South Germans stand on the same level. There are enough educated people in the North, travellers in many lands, who almost glory in the fact that they have never seen Vienna; just as there are such in the South who are proud of having always avoided going to the capital on the Spree.”

In German literature, down to comparatively recent days, depreciation of Austrian writers was the rule rather than the exception. “Grillparzer,” wrote a North German critic, “is an Austrian poet who happens not to have written in the Magyar or Czech tongue, but in German. His works cannot be considered as manifestations of the German spirit.” In a sense this was true enough, for Grillparzer was an Austrian in every fibre, and disliked Prussian arrogance and pedantry intensely. Nor was the dramatist the only German-Austrian writer thoroughly representative of the Austrian spirit as distinguished from the Prussian. Lenau, Raimund, Rosegger, and Anzenzruber

are notable instances of this in literature, as were Mozart, Schubert, Haydn, and Johann Strauss in music, and Schwind in art.

Vienna and Berlin, though ostensibly united, are in reality far apart. Austria has not forgotten the series of humiliations suffered for a century and more at the hands of the Hohenzollerns. Bismarck's policy, from the beginning to the end of his career, was one long, carefully wrought-out plan for destroying Austrian influence, first in the German Federation, and then in all Europe. A hundred frankly cynical pages in his Memoirs bear this out. And only two years ago one of Bismarck's successors labored hard to barter away some of Austria's fairest provinces for Italy's promise to keep out of the war.

As was Austria, so were Bavaria, Saxony, and other German states but pawns in Prussia's game. Bismarck had them all in mind when he wrote, in 1859, to Minister von Schleinitz of that "infirmity of Prussia's" which could only be healed *ferro et igni*. Fire and sword are

once more the motto of Prussian statesmanship, but Prussia, now the arbiter of the fate of all Germany, has still to reckon with her "faithful ally." Austria stands at the parting of the ways. Her alliance with the Hohenzollern, forced upon her by fancied political necessity, is not based on inner kinship in thought and feeling, not on ancient historical tradition, nor on community of future interests. It is a hollow pretence, rife with the seeds of future dissension. When the break between Hohenzollern and Hapsburg will come, it would be rash to predict, but that the present union will not outlast the war is certain. The tone of the last Austrian note to our Government portends unmistakably a change in the relations between the Teutonic Powers. Whatever Germany may decide upon in her delusion, Austria cannot risk the severance of her relations with the United States.

The Future of Bohemia

[From The New York *Evening Post*, May 16, 1917.]

Bohemia is declared to be in a state of siege. What does the news portend for the future of the kingdom and the entire Hapsburg monarchy? Are the prospects of peace brought nearer by this emphatic evidence of civic strife in the most important crownland of Cisleithania? A possible answer to such questions concerning the future may be sought in a retrospect of the past.

"Whoever is master of Bohemia is master of Europe," said Bismarck. He had in mind, not the nominal rulership, but the mastery of problems which from the time of the fall of the great Moravian empire, about the year 900, have never ceased to trouble Europe. Throughout her perturbations Bohemia has within the past century grown economically to a commanding position in Austria and Europe. Agriculturally and industrially highly productive, with enormously rich coal de-

posits and the most famous mineral springs in the world, Bohemia, "the pearl in the crown of St. Wenceslas," enjoys indeed a proud preëminence. For centuries, too, Bohemia has been prominent in the arts of peace. The Czech nation gave Comenius (Komensky) to the world, and in more recent times Bohemia has been one of the artistic centres of Europe. Gluck conducted his first operas in Prague and Mozart's Don Juan first saw there the light.

Down to the close of the eighteenth century Europe was but little concerned in the destinies of Bohemia. Since then the awakened national aspirations of the Czechs, amid the general revival of Slavdom, have drawn the attention of foreign observers to a long-neglected subject. And now the note of the Entente Powers, with its implied promise of the restoration of the realm of Bohemia, which came to an end in 1620, fixes the gaze of all the world upon the Austrian province seemingly destined to play an important part in the final settlement of the war. "A great em-

pire, like a great cake," says Franklin, "is most easily diminished at the edges."

Naturally enough, certain Czech patriots and agitators have sought by every means at their command to use the present opportunity to undermine the hold of the Hapsburgs on their North Slavic dominions. The realm of St. Wenceslas is to be restored, but how is the dream to be realized? The advocates of the plan picture to themselves a country consisting of Bohemia proper, Moravia, and Silesia, plus the Slovak districts of northern Hungary, the whole to comprise about 50,000 square miles, and to contain about 12,000,000 inhabitants. The English translation of the Entente note spoke of the liberation of the "Czecho-Slovaks," instead of the "Czechs and Slovaks" (as the French original had it), but the resuscitation of Bohemia as an independent nation, with "Slovakia" as an integral part, has not in any quarter been clearly formulated. In a matter of such importance the details are everything. "Slovakia" has had no political existence since the

tenth century, and its present limits, having reference only to the regions of Hungary where Slovaks predominate, are not easily defined. It is admitted by those who favor the incorporation of Slovakia that not all her children in Hungary can return to the fold. The fate of the Slovaks in other parts of Hungary than those which are to be merged in the new Bohemia is left in doubt; nor do we get the slightest hint as to the status of the Magyars who will find themselves incorporated in the new state, together with the Slovaks. The forced consent of the Hungarian nation to the cession of their northern territory is, of course, assumed, just as is the consent of the Government of Cisleithania to the liberation of all Bohemia. What is to be the form of government to be adopted for the new state? On the whole, a monarchy seems to be preferred, though some advocates of total separation from Austria incline to a republican form of government.

Prof. T. G. Masaryk, formerly of the University of Prague, and now an exile

in London, passes lightly over the question of the constitution of the new Bohemia. Writing in the *New Europe*, shortly before the establishment of the present Government of Russia, he says:

The dynastic question is left to the decision of the Allies, who might perhaps give one of their own princes. There might be a personal union between Servia and Bohemia, if the Serbs and Bohemians were to be neighboring countries. A personal union with Russia or with Poland, if the latter were to be quite independent, has also been suggested. (German and Austrian princes must *co ipso* be excluded.) The Bohemian people are thoroughly Slavophile. A Russian dynasty, in whatever form, would be most popular, and, in any case, Bohemian politicians desire the establishment of the kingdom of Bohemia in complete accord with Russia.

This is equalled in vagueness only by the suggestion that "so far as the German minority is concerned, I should not be opposed to a rectification of the political frontier; parts of Bohemia and Moravia, where there are only a few Czechs, might be ceded to German Austria." We

must remember that in present Bohemia the proportion of Germans to Czechs is as thirty-seven to sixty-three, and that the German minority, so nonchalantly to be disposed of, contains most of the mechanical and technological skill, enterprise, and wealth, that Bohemia boasts. Moreover, there is nothing in the history of the kingdom, remote or recent, to warrant the assumption of future harmony between the common people and the aristocracy—a very important consideration in the case of a country where noble families have perhaps greater power and influence than has any other aristocracy in Europe. The feudal nobility of Bohemia has never identified itself with the people—German or Czech—as has the Magyar aristocracy with the masses of Hungary. The Princes Schwarzenberg own one-thirteenth of the land; the Lobkowitzes, Clam-Martinitzes, and many other noblemen ranged on the side of the feudalists are scarcely less influential than the Schwarzenbergs. Generally opposed to the feudalists in political matters involving the equality of the

Czech and German languages, but equally aloof from the masses, are the Princes Auersperg and other German-speaking landed proprietors, whom the new Bohemia will find it anything but easy to dispossess or expatriate. And not only Bohemian noblemen of both nationalities have hitherto been attached to the house of Hapsburg, but the bulk of the Czech people have been distinctly loyal on various critical occasions. That a cataclysm like the present war has led to something like revolt, both in the army and in civil life, is explainable enough on purely economic grounds. Up to the outbreak of the war the most fervent of Czech nationalists have acquiesced in the overlordship of the Hapsburgs, and clamored only for an autonomy of Bohemia like that which Hungary enjoys, within the monarchy. That the Hapsburg régime, with rare exceptions, has on the whole consistently opposed the political and literary aspirations of Czech leaders has not disturbed the vision of those among them clear-sighted enough to recognize

that an independent state of Bohemia would mean a Bohemia exposed to the ambitions of neighboring states and the entanglements of European politics.

The principal spokesman for Czech aspirations in the last century, the historian, Francis Palacky, a patriot of great renown, is credited with the authorship of the dictum that "if Austria did not exist it would have to be invented." Palacky wrote as late as 1865: "To pretend that the resources of so vast an Empire are to be devoted entirely to the service of one or two favorite peoples, while the others who contribute equally to the might of the whole estate are to be content with what may be allowed them, is equal to saying: 'We are the masters and you are the servants.'" It is true, Palacky's argument was directed against the Germans of Bohemia, but he was too good a logician not to know that his reasoning could be turned both ways. "The Slavs," he declared, "desire the prosperity of the monarchy, on condition that they are given guarantees for their

normal development.” He feared—not hoped—that the Dualism established in 1867 portended the eventual dismemberment of the monarchy.

Another fallacy in the reasoning of those who would identify Pan-Slavic aims with present Czech aspirations is the assumption that Bohemians have always been wishing to throw in their lot with the kindred races of Austria and other countries. The truth is that the Czechs of Bohemia have had but a tempered sympathy with the aspirations of other Slavic peoples. The idea of a Pan-Slavic union occurred to Kollar, generally considered the father of the movement, mainly for literary purposes. He first advanced the plan in 1831, and, of course, from that the step to a furtherance of political aims was a natural one. During the revolution of 1848 the Bohemians, while taking the leadership in the Slavic movement which then seemed to promise success, were far apart from several of their Slavic brethren. The general Slavic congress convoked by Palacky at Prague resulted

in a split into two camps. The Czechs declared in favor of the Austrian Government, as did the South-Slavic Croats and Serbs. The Poles, who had learned to see in the Russians their natural oppressors, espoused the cause of Hungary. Pan-Slavism is to day as little of a practical fact as it was during the revolution of 1848.

It never entered Palacky's mind that the revival of the Czech language meant the creation of a Czecho-Slovak state. Up to about 1850 he and a few scholars like Schafarik represented all that there was in Czech literature, in the creation of which he was chiefly interested. It is told of him that when he and a small number of his friends gathered at his house on one occasion he remarked jestingly: "If the roof should now fall, the whole of Czech literature would be buried in its ruins." Nevertheless, the stimulus given to Czech aims by the present war is not surprising, and, properly expressed and led into practical channels, it may lead to important results. Austria is on the verge of ex-

haustion, and after laying her heavy hand on Czech "rebels" like Dr. Kramarsch, the Government may even before the conclusion of peace be forced to gentler measures in dealing with her recalcitrant subjects in Bohemia. Possibly the leaders of the present movement among the Czechs, as well as the European statesmen eventually charged with peace negotiations, may come to the conclusion that an autonomous Bohemia within the Empire may be a stronger guarantee of future peace to all concerned than a nominally free Bohemia without. One thing, at all events, is certain. The Czechs of Bohemia will never lend a willing ear to Pan-German blandishments. They may make peace, in their own interest, with the Hapsburgs but they will never cease to distrust the Hohenzollerns. They still feel towards German chauvinism as they did in the day when Ladislav Rieger, Palacky's son-in-law and the most eloquent spokesman of his people, said in a famous discourse: "You always talk of German science and civilization. How often have these idols been held

up to us for our admiration! One never hears any one talk of French science and civilization, but 'Deutsche Wissenschaft' is such a mouth-filling morsel!"

It is to be hoped that at the conclusion of peace the Czechs, like the Poles, may be masters of their destinies, but it is premature to forecast their decision. Austria in her strength and her weakness—her diversified German and non-German material and intellectual interests, as well as her hopeless internal dissensions—is to-day the greatest stumbling block in the path of Germany's single-minded ruthlessness. Pan-Germanism, always confined in Lower Austria to a handful of noisy demagogues, has made no converts since the war. Vienna is not yet ready to sink to the level of a lesser Berlin. And all Austria will long remember that Prussia lured her into the present war and, when hostilities were scarcely begun, brought every pressure to bear upon her to make her relinquish some of her fairest provinces for the sake of keeping Italy from joining the Allies. Such an alliance in arms has

taught Austria what to expect in a future partnership in "Central Europe." It will be the task of wise statesmanship among the Allies to reconcile the claims of the Czechs with the position of Austria as an important factor in eventual combinations that shall bring about peace and save the world from future aggression on the part of Germany.

Hungary and the Fall of Tisza

[From *The New York Nation*, May 31, 1917.]

THE resignation of the Tisza Ministry is an event the significance of which will be felt on all the battlefields of Europe. Exactly fifty years after the regained autonomy of Hungary was sealed by the coronation of Francis Joseph at Budapest, his successor to the crown of St. Stephen parts with the services of the Premier who has been the most powerful advocate of the alliance between the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs. Count Tisza had staked his fate on the unshaken continuance of that alliance, and he has fallen. Ostensibly he resigned because the Emperor Charles refused to approve of his attitude concerning the reform of the franchise in the Hungarian kingdom, and it may well be that the voice of the various nationalities who are clamoring for a juster share in the Government than the Magyars

have hitherto accorded them can no longer be suppressed; but more serious problems are confronting both halves of the monarchy to-day than even the question of universal manhood suffrage in Hungary.

Public opinion in Hungary is divided on the question of continuing the war. We have heard of Count Károlyi, the leader of a branch of the Independence party, strongly urging the need of peace and repudiating all ideas of conquest; and of such influential papers as the *Pesti Hirlap* and the *Pesti Naplo* (once famous as the organ of Francis Deák) ranging themselves on the side of the opposition to Tisza. Finally, there came the cable news of a bitter attack of the *Pesti Naplo* on Count Reventlow and of the Socialist organ, *Népszava*, on Tirpitz, while three members of the Chamber of Deputies were quoted as condemning the present submarine warfare.

Little has been heard during the war of the once powerful Kossuth party. Its very name has been merged in that of other groups, but that its principles will revive

after the war is as certain as that the spell of that famous leader has not forever lost its potency. How will his teachings comport with the new order of things in Hungary if the Pan-Germanists and advocates of a new Central Europe have their way? Can Magyars ever forget his fierce detestation of the Hapsburgs, his glowing admiration for Anglo-Saxons? "It is the Anglo-Saxon race alone," he said, in an address in this country on March 6, 1852, "that stands high and erect in its independence. . . . And inviolability of person and the inviolability of property are English principles. England is the last stronghold of these principles in Europe." And contrast with this his remark about Prussia, on a similar occasion: "What would the petty princes of Germany have been in 1848 without Prussia? And what was Prussia, when her capital was in the hands of the people, without the certainty of the Czar's support?"

Tisza, who returned to power as Premier in 1913, after having been in the Cabinet from 1903 to 1906, has been the subject

of bitter opposition both before and since the outbreak of the war. He resumed office after Prime Minister Lukács had introduced, in 1912, a franchise bill the provisions of which would have doubled the electorate, but which still left the favored classes with so many privileges that the Radical party and the Socialists raised a fierce outcry against the Government's proposal. Tisza, who was then President of the Chamber, was the principal target of abuse, and after he became Premier he had to face a new Opposition party, organized by Count Andrassy, who was, and has since been, committed to the reform of the franchise. Tisza declared universal suffrage to be a national danger. He not unnaturally feared that the political equality of the various nationalities of Hungary would threaten Magyar hegemony. But the exigencies of war lead to strange avowals and disavowals. Tisza recently seemed to experience a sudden change of heart and professed in Parliament his affection for the non-Magyar races. "Nowhere in the world," he said, "is the prin-

ciple of nationality applied so liberally as in the two states of the Dual Monarchy."

These idyllic conditions have not always prevailed either in Cisleithania or in Hungary. Few modern Magyar statesmen have consistently adhered to the principles of Deák and Eötvös, who labored honestly for a conciliatory policy towards non-Magyar nationalities and respected their languages and customs. Their enlightened views gave way in the seventies to the ruthlessly chauvinistic policy of the elder Tisza, and the Magyarization of the state has since gone on apace. The intolerance of the Government towards Parliamentary representatives of other races may be illustrated by an incident which occurred last February. A well-known Slovak Deputy, Father Juriga, who had suffered imprisonment for his nationalist principles, discussed a bill before the Chamber designed to perpetuate the memory of the heroes who had fallen in battle. In the course of his remarks he requested the House to permit him to read a letter written in the Slovak language by a sol-

dier who had thanked the Minister of Education for having allowed, during the war, the study of the Slovak language in secondary schools. But after violent interruption on the part of the Opposition leaders, the Chamber ruled that not a single Slovak word could be spoken by any Deputy, and Juriga desisted from his purpose with the quiet remark: "I do not wish to create a scandal, and therefore content myself with pointing out that in this House quotations may be read in English and French, the languages of the enemy, but not in some of the languages of our own country."

The Germans within the limits of Hungary have on the whole bowed more meekly to the rule of the Magyar than the other nationalities. Indeed, their outward transformation into Magyars—the Saxons of Transylvania alone excepted—has in the large towns been rapid, and as they had no separatist aspirations, there has been little political friction between them and the dominant race. German names of places have disappeared from school geographies,

and in many instances German patronymics have been gladly exchanged by their bearers for more sonorous Magyar ones. Yet the war has not drawn Magyars and Teutons closer to each other. Officially they may fraternize, organically they do not fuse. Hungarian and Austrian generals bore a distinguished part in the early battles, when German armies came to the rescue of their hard-pressed allies in the Carpathians and elsewhere, but the names of Kövess and Boehm-Ermolli are never mentioned when Germans sing the praises of Hindenburg and Mackensen. Nor have the South Slavs of the monarchy learned during the war to look with friendlier eyes on Berlin and Vienna than before. With the fate of Servia as a warning example before them, the loyalty of Serbo-Croats to the Hapsburgs and their willingness to place themselves under the ægis of the Hohenzollerns have been sorely tried. The Croats and Magyars have always been at daggers drawn. It may be taken as axiomatic that what the Magyar desires the Croat opposes. Croatia has

never concealed its bitter discontent with Dualism, and Hungarian politicians have fully reciprocated the feeling of the Croats. Recent utterances of the newspapers of Agram and Fiume that occasionally find their way to this country reflect the dissatisfaction of the people with prevailing economic conditions—a feeling which extends to the political situation as well.

Tisza had originally not been particularly friendly to the German designs on Austria-Hungary, which have found expression in the plan of a “Mitteleuropa.” He opposed the economic federation between the Central Powers and those European states which Germany was especially anxious to place under her wings. In truth, he distrusted more than one partner in the future Central Europe, and like all Magyar statesmen of the present day, who seek in every political combination solely the interest of their own race, he thought of the future, while the statesmen of Vienna thought chiefly of the present. Whether his dismissal from office now is due to his own recognition of the

fact that the alliance between Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns is tottering, or whether the Emperor Charles wishes to have a free hand in movements which might find in the fiery Hungarian a dangerous opponent, Tisza's fall presages in any case an unmistakable change in the relations between Germany and Austria-Hungary. The fact is that, though the two countries have been politically united since the outbreak of the war, they have in their military activity since their early common successes been gradually drifting apart. Germany is fighting her battles in France alone, as Austria is fighting hers in the Trentino and the Coast Districts. The fate of the Monarchy is nearer to the heart of its ruler than the future of his German ally. As for his subjects, they are skeptical, and they were long forced to remain silent. Previous experiences in their history have taught all the peoples of the Empire not to build their hopes too firmly on military victories. In 1866 Austria humbled Italy in the sea-fight at Lissa, and was compelled to give up Venetia to her. She was

crushed at Sadowa by Prussia, and Hungary gained her autonomy and Cisleithania a liberal Constitution. And to-day, with the fortunes of war still in the balance, Slavs, Rumans, and others look expectantly to a future that shall bring them, somehow, through some turn of affairs at home or abroad, their coveted self-government.

Whoever may be Tisza's successor, an element of unrest is now working in the Empire which is certain to influence the course of affairs. Vienna has served notice on Budapest that it intends to become once more the centre of political gravity, but whether the Government, with or without the sanction of the representatives of the people—it is reported that for the first time in more than three years the Reichsrat has been convened—will be able to strike out into new paths, internally as well as externally, remains to be seen. Too little is known of the new Emperor to warrant the assumption that he intends to rule with the help of the liberal Germans of Austria, but he certainly cannot permanently ignore them. Though ever since

the fall of the Auersperg Ministry, in 1879, they have been out of power, they are a factor to be reckoned with. Their voice is bound to be heard again, and its echoes will reach Berlin. The Austrian Germans will not forever follow whither Prussia shall lead. Once more, as so often in the past, the inherent antagonism between Austrians and Prussians manifests itself. The Germans of Lower and Upper Austria, of Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, the Tyrol, and other Crown lands, who are mostly of purer Teutonic stock than the Prussians, are beginning to ask unpleasant questions. They are getting tired of being called Germanic brethren when it suits Prussian advantage to claim them, and to be repudiated when the wind blows from another quarter. As in politics so in literature. For many long years there seemed to be, in Grillparzer's words, a conspiracy against Austrian writers in Germany. She looked askance at the great dramatist himself, though she gradually learned to adopt him and other Austrians,

just as she has adopted Swiss writers like Gottfried Keller and Konrad Ferdinand Meyer.

It must be said, in all fairness, that since the elder Andrásy's death, no Austrian statesman except Tisza has made it his task to promote a genuine alliance between Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns. Count Aehrenthal, the only Minister of Foreign Affairs in recent years who has left his impress on Austrian politics, was concerned purely with the aggrandizement of his own country—though in ways that proved disastrous in the end—and did not ask for Germany's consent to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But he fashioned his course closely after her ruthless *Realpolitik*. Austria has since chosen to identify herself still more completely with Prussia's foreign policy, heedless of the warning given to the Hapsburgs, years ago, by so stanch a defender of Prussian principles as Professor Delbrück. He wrote (*Preussische Jahrbücher*, Vol. 130) : "The conception of nationality has attained in the nineteenth century through-

out the world a power which it is absolutely useless to contend against. We have seen in the case of Prussia how little even a state of its gigantic strength can accomplish against a few million scattered Poles. The sooner German-Austrians make up their minds to recognize the equality of all nationalities, even the smallest, and the more willing they show themselves to make all the practical sacrifices inherent in such a recognition, the better it will be for them and for the German cause everywhere. The hope for such a consummation lies in Austria's relations to Hungary and in her foreign policy."

The task of Tisza's successor in the internal affairs of Hungary is clear enough—there can be no retreat from the principle of the equality of her nationalities; as to the future foreign policy of Austria, that, as well as the foreign policy of Germany, will be shaped by the issue of the present war.

The Poles of Austria

[From *The New York Nation*, July 5, 1917.]

Appointment of a stop-gap Ministry gives Emperor Charles a breathing spell before grappling definitely with a serious crisis. Czech Deputies are rebellious, as Czech regiments have long been, and the Poles are clamoring for more emphatic recognition in the government of Austria. All parties in Galicia have been watching events in Russia closely, and the course of the Poles in national affairs will be shaped by international developments.

On the whole, ever since the ruthless suppression of the peasant rising in Galicia, in 1846, the Austrian Government has shown distinct partiality and a certain skill in its dealings with the Poles, favoring the nobility without actively antagonizing the rural population, and granting concessions to the national spirit which were at times galling enough to Germans and Ruthenes. In 1868 Polish became the vehicle of instruction in the

University of Cracow, as it became somewhat later in the University of Lemberg, and Polish officials replaced German ones throughout Galicia. Von Grocholski entered in 1871 the first Austrian Cabinet as Minister for Galicia, and Polish influence has since made itself felt both in the Ministries and in the Reichsrat. Polish patriots have risen to leadership in the Austrian Parliament. Francis Smolka, who had been condemned to death for treason before 1848, became in 1881 President of the Lower House of the Vienna Reichsrat, and in more recent times another Galician Deputy, the Armenian Abrahamowicz, occupied the same place. Such distinctions, however, were not won without resort to skilful parliamentary tactics, and sometimes to obstinate opposition to the methods of Germanizing politicians. The Compromise of 1867 was at first a sore trial to the Poles. Dualism, with Magyar preponderance, was as little to their liking as Federalism, with Bohemian autonomy, would have been. The fifty-seven Polish Deputies, whose votes

could decide important parliamentary issues, withdrew from the Reichsrat. As in the case of the Czechs, the policy of abstention proved successful in the long run, and the Poles have to the present day been better able to maintain their ground in the councils of the Empire than any other of the Slavic races of Austria.

The relations between the Polish aristocracy and the Austrian Government were badly strained in 1908, in consequence of the Russian propaganda, carried on among the Ruthene peasantry of Galicia. To this Count Szeptycki, the United-Greek Archbishop of Lemberg, who was subsequently taken into Russian captivity, but has since been released by the Provisional Government, lent his willing aid. The Poles, as ever opposed to Ukrainophile pretensions, were hostile alike to the efforts of Austria and Russia to strengthen their hold on the Ruthenes—the former through agents of the Catholic Church, the latter through those of the Orthodox-Greek. The tension, which led to the assassination of the Governor,

Count Potocki, by a Ruthene student, resulted in the appointment, for the first time in the annals of Galicia, of a non-aristocratic Pole, the historian, Dr. Bobrzynski, to the Governorship. He endeavored to mediate, not with conspicuous success, between Poles and Ruthenes. The breach between them, in fact, widened when, in March, 1913, the Governor attempted to carry through the Galician Diet a bill for electoral reform intended to effect a compromise. He was forced to resign, and through his successor, Von Korytowski, a Polish nobleman, the ruling classes of Galicia were once more brought closer to the Vienna Government. Since then, however, developments in the Austro-German alliance have wrought a change in the attitude of Polish and Ruthene leaders toward each other and toward the Government. The Poles, through their spokesman, Count Stanislas Tarnowski, president of the Cracow Academy of Sciences, had charged the Ukrainists as early as March, 1914, in the Galician Diet, with close affiliation with

the Pan-German Ostmarken-Verein, an association notoriously bent on destroying the Polish nationality. The Ruthenes then plainly showed themselves susceptible to German influence. It was generally believed by them that the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, under instructions from Berlin, favored the establishment of a Ukraine state, to whose rule the children of his morganatic marriage might succeed. The war has ended this dream, though it has not allayed the restlessness and mutual jealousies of Poles and Ruthenes.

The question of the resuscitation of the ancient kingdom of Poland, which has now come to the front, has overshadowed the narrower Polish question in Austria. Since the issuing of the proclamation to all the Poles by Grand Duke Nicholas, in August, 1914, there has been constant interchange of thought between the Polish leaders of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Sienkiewicz, among others, called on his compatriots everywhere to identify themselves with the cause of the Russian peo-

ple, and Count Wielopolski, the president of the Polish Club of the Duma that assembled at the outbreak of the war, has stood for a compromise between Russians and Poles which was first advocated by his namesake, the Marquis Wielopolski, after the revolution of 1830.

The occupation of Galicia by the Russians introduced a new element of uncertainty into the situation. Attached as many of the prominent Poles were to the house of Hapsburg, and much as they resented the arrogance and brutality of the Russian Governor, Count Bobrinsky, who kept Lemberg under the heel of Russian autocracy, they yet felt their Polish sentiment enlisted by the liberal stirrings of Warsaw. The fortunes of war have rendered the hope of all Poles for a restoration of their ancient kingdom not entirely illusory. Apparently, Germany encourages the plans of Austria. It has been asserted that the Archduke Charles Stephen, whose sons-in-law, Prince Radziwill and Prince Czartoryski, bear names famous in the history of Poland, has been selected

for the throne of the restored kingdom; but whatever faith Galician Poles may put in Austrian promises, they will look long before they leap into a Hohenzollern trap. Their position in the Hapsburg dominions during the last fifty years has been by no means intolerable, and it is now more than ever within their power to strengthen their influence.

The plan of a restored Poland under Hapsburg rule has been mooted before, and even Metternich was not wholly insincere in proposing it at a time when an alliance with France and England against Russia seemed feasible. Napoleon III., too, had his plan for restoring Poland and placing it under the rule of an Austrian archduke. Bismarck took notice, during the Crimean War, of similar ideas of various European diplomatists, but dismissed them as fantastic. But whatever he thought of Austria as a possible ruler of Poland, he never deceived himself (as little as did his successor, Prince Bülow) as to the hopelessness of any attempt on the part of Prussia to gain Polish favor.

“The love of the Poles of Galicia for the German Empire,” he wrote in his *Recollections*, “is of a fitful and opportunist nature,” and he recognized that Austria had at all times a stronger hold on Polish sympathies than Germany. He admonished Germans not to look upon Poles in any other light than that of enemies, and remarked that Austria could the more easily come to terms with the Polish movement because, notwithstanding the memories of 1846, she still retained more of the sympathy of Polish nobles than either Prussia or Russia.

The world cataclysm has changed nothing in the relations of Prussia toward her Polish subjects, but a new Russia makes a new appeal to hers. At all events, there is no place in a future Poland for Hohenzollern influence, no matter what the rôle of the Hapsburgs may be in the nation that is to arise from the ashes of the present war.

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The Nation may well be proud of its Staff of Contributors. Started in 1865 by Edwin Lawrence Godkin and Wendell Phillips Garrison, who showed remarkable discrimination in selecting writers with special knowledge and with a command of style, this Staff has been perpetuated in the spirit of its founders. Instead of turning to the facile publicist for discussions of outstanding questions, The Nation has found that a thorough knowledge of a given subject such as its experts possess does not prevent the full-hearted utterance which these grave times require.

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